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Abstract
This paper puts forward a case for an educational initiative in information security at both
the undergraduate and graduate levels. Its focus is on the need for such education, the desired
educational outcomes, and how the outcomes may be assessed. A basic thesis of this paper is
that the goals, methods, and evaluation techniques of information and computer security are
consistent with and supportive of the stated goals of engineering education and the growing
movement for outcomes-based assessment in higher education.
1 Why Information Security Education is Needed
Networked computing and information retrieval are considered by many to be crucial to the well-
being of the nation's information infrastructure [14]. The information infrastructure includes such
diverse and complex applications as telecommunications, air trac control, health care, mobile
computing and electronic commerce. These applications rely on a collection of switching systems,
databases, network protocols, scheduling and routing algorithms, distributed hardware, and concur-
rent software. These systems must work correctly and economically with guarantees of performance,
availability of service, safety, and security.
The increasing use, reliance upon, and vulnerability of these large-scale information systems is
called the \Information Security Problem" by the National Research Council in its book, Cryptog-
raphy's Role in Securing the Information Society, [40].
Today's information age requires U.S. businesses to compete on a worldwide basis, sharing sensi-
tive information with appropriate parties while protecting that information against competitors,
vandals, suppliers, customers, and foreign governments. Private law-abiding citizens dislike the
ease with which personal telephone calls can be tapped, especially those carried on cellular or
cordless telephones. Elements of the U.S. civilian infrastructure such as the banking system, the
electric power grid, the public switched telecommunications network, and the air trac control
1
system are central to so many dimensions of modern life that protecting these elements must
have a high priority.
One of the major problems confronting the security community cited by Peeger and Cooper
[29] is: \The advances in computer security have not been able to keep pace with the changes in
computing in general." In the rush to eld new products and services, developers have often ignored
security as a fundamental system requirement.
The Defense Science Board puts it more bluntly in its November 1996 report, Report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare { Defense (IW-D) [7]:
The reality is that the vulnerability of the Department of Defense { and of the nation { to
oensive information warfare attack is largely a self-created problem. Program by program,
economic sector by economic sector, we have based critical functions on inadequately protected
telecomputing services. In aggregate, we have created a target-rich environment and the U.S.
industry has sold globallymuch of the generic technology that can be used to strike these targets.
The challenge is to design, develop and deploy complex systems with condence in their ability to
satisfy security requirements. Fortunately, a \Theory of Computer Security" [8] has emerged that
has three components: a precisely articulated security policy describing the mangement, protec-
tion, and distribution of sensitive information by an organization, a set of functional mechanisms
sucient to enforce the policy, and assurance that the mechanisms do enforce the policy. Its
implications are that:
 to achieve a coherent security architecture, security must be considered from the outset and
not as an afterthought; and
 competence in design for security policy enforcement, testing for security, and assessment of
security must be part of the education of system implementors.
Currently, few resources are being applied to educating security professionals, as noted by Spaf-
ford [42]:
Our students and soon-to-be students will be designing our information technologies of the
future. We are endangering them and ourselves because the majority of them will receive no
training in information security.
Executive Order 13010 established a Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Pro-
tection [27]. Strategies for security against computer-based attacks on information and computer
systems are a primary commission objective and \education on methods of reducing vulnerabilities
and responding to attacks on critical infrastructures" is an concern. To remedy the lack of com-
puter science professionals educated in computer security noted by Spaord [42], the Commission
has recommended [28] signicant eorts to foster programs producing graduates in information and
computer security.
The above need for education is echoed by the Defense Science Board. It recommends:
 working with the National Science Foundation to \develop educational programs for curricu-
lum development at the undergraduate and graduate levels in resilient system design prac-
tices," and
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 making the \required skill set much broader and deeper in educational level [for] computer
scientists, network engineers, electronics engineers, business process engineers."
To satisfy the above educational goals we must move to a culture of engineering. Broadly
speaking, engineering is fundamentally about assuring results using techniques based on scientic
principles. The goal is to engineer secure systems ab initio with assurance rather than to discover
that what we have built is inadequate. Do current engineering and computer science curricula
provide students with an understanding of the foundational concepts of computer security? The
answer is \no." Computer security diers from other engineering approaches in that the system
must be implemented such that security policy enforcement takes place even in the presence of
malicious code. At the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Schell [39] noted that in
the context of a subverted system a lack of security may not be evident.
By moving to a culture of engineering which includes appropriate knowledge of security, we can
increase the likelihood that our next generation of information technology workers will have the
background they need to design and develop systems which are engineered to be reliable and secure
{ that they are designed to protect information in the face of malicious software [8].
The security community has long embraced the concepts of requirements, policies, specica-
tions, application of best implementation practices, assessment, and certication. When looking at
curriculum development, analogous notions hold. These educational notions include:
 identication of educational criteria for selection of educational outcomes;
 identication of specic educational outcomes and skills;
 design of courses and curricula to meet the identied outcomes;
 designing means of assessment to evaluate the satisfaction of outcomes;
 assessing the actual outcomes; and
 utilizing feedback from assessment to improve curricula and courses.
The technique of identifying specic educational goals, assessing the results, and using these
assessment results to improve educational processes is fully embraced by both the Accreditation
Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) for accrediting all engineering programs in the
US [12], and by the American Society for Engineering Education (ASEE), [13]. Examining the
educational goals of information security within the context of engineering and ABET accredita-
tion is appropriate. Electrical and computer engineers, and computer scientists, many of whom
are educated within colleges of engineering, are responsible for the design, implementation, and
deployment of much of the information infrastructure. Their knowledge and understanding of the
principles underlying and the engineering techniques used to construct secure systems is essen-
tial for the protection of systems from the smallest to the largest and at all levels of civilian and
government enterprise. This paper provides a framework for integrating information security into
computer science and computer engineering education.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the criteria used to
select the educational outcomes in Section 3. Section 3 relates the educational goals of security
and engineering and computer science within a common framework. Section 4 outlines proposed
assessment criteria. Section 5 discusses computer security education programs. Conclusions are in
Section 6.
3
2 Criteria for Selecting Educational Outcomes
It is insucient and impractical to say everybody needs to know everything about security. Knowl-
edge and skills appropriate to each role in the \information society" must be identied. There is a
need for technical literacy among decision makers within enterprises, government, military defense,
health care, higher education, etc. The focus here is on technical education in computer and net-
work security. The overarching criteria for selecting educational outcomes for information security
are:
 the educational outcomes must address security needs consistent
with the security challenges encountered by graduates in their pro-
fessional roles, and
 the specic educational outcomes for security in a given educational
programmust be consistent with the educational context and larger
outcomes of the specic program.
Irvine in \Challenges in Computer Security Education," [20], identies ten roles or job titles with
associated security concerns. These roles are:
1. the general population;
2. corporate information professionals;
3. computer professionals;
4. system administrators;
5. computer security emergency response team (CERT) members;
6. secure software and hardware developers;
7. system architects;
8. system certiers;
9. legal professionals and law enforcement; and
10. security researchers.
Of the above ten roles, programs of electrical and computer engineering and computer science
are primarily concerned with the education of software and hardware developers, system architects,
system certiers, CERT members, and security researchers. For these roles, Irvine [20] identies
educational needs for each as follows:
 Software and hardware developers, when developing new components, should know how to
build security into products. They should understand how hardware can support security
objectives and how software can leverage hardware to produce systems able to enforce specic
security policies.
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 System architects must know how dierent security mechanisms within the system work to-
gether; a awed component can obviate all other protection features. They must understand
overall requirements and must be able to design a system that meets a variety of obligations,
including those of security.
 System certiers must know how to inspect the design and implementation of systems to
determine the level of condence to be ascribed to those systems' ability to enforce security
policies. They must understand the properties of the underlying hardware as well as the
software and must be able to analyze the evidence that high level policy is mapped to the
policy enforcement mechanism. Rigorous approaches to aw analysis and the exposure of
system elements vulnerable to clandestine exploitation are required.
 CERT members must know how aws in existing systems make those systems vulnerable to
external threats. They must understand both hardware and software factors that contribute
to the creation of system aws and vulnerabilities, and generalize solutions across potentially
large sets of services and products.
 Security researchers push the technological envelope. They must understand the interplay
between security and other system properties such as fault tolerance and real-time constraints.
They should have a deep understanding of computer science and the scientic foundations of
computer security, and have signicant specialized knowledge in their area of research.
How well do these goals match with the evaluation criteria for engineering and computer sci-
ence programs? The Computing Sciences Accreditation Board (CSAB) criteria for curriculum
assessment emphasizes the importance of the scientic method as a key concept within a computer
science curriculum [9]. Table 1 below lists the skill set specied by ABET in its report, Engineering
Criteria 2000 [12].
Comparing the security skills needed by 1) software and hardware developers, 2) system archi-
tects, 3) system certiers, 4) CERT members and 5) researchers, with the ABET criteria reveals a
close match in the following areas:
 an ability to apply knowledge of mathematics, science, and engineering;
 an ability to design and conduct experiments, as well as to analyze and interpret data;
 an ability to design a system, component, or process to meet desired needs;
 an ability to identify, formulate, and solve engineering problems
 an ability to use the techniques, skills, and modern engineering tools necessary for engineering
practice; and
 an ability to communicate eectively.
Additionally, the broader areas of
 an understanding of professional and ethical responsibility;
 the broad education necessary to understand the impact of engineering solutions in a global
and societal context; and
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Table 1: ABET Evaluation Criteria for Engineering Programs
Criterion 3. Program Outcomes and Assessment
Engineering programs must demonstrate that their graduates have
1. an ability to apply knowledge of mathematics, science, and engineering
2. an ability to design and conduct experiments, as well as to analyze and interpret
data
3. an ability to design a system, component, or process to meet desired needs
4. an ability to function on multi-disciplinary team (CERT) members
5. an ability to identify, formulate, and solve engineering problems
6. an understanding of professional and ethical responsibility
7. an ability to communicate eectively
8. the broad education necessary to understand the impact of engineering solu-
tions in a global and societal context
9. a recognition of the need for, and an ability to engage in life-long learning
10. a knowledge of contemporary issues
11. an ability to use the techniques, skills, and modern engineering tools necessary
for engineering practice.
 a knowledge of contemporary issues
provide meaningful connections to the other roles identied by Irvine in [20].
Section 3 renes the connections between security and engineering education goals within a
common framework.
3 Educational Outcomes
In Section 2 we juxtaposed the educational goals of engineering and computer science against the
educational needs in the area of security for various societal roles. In this section we will relate the
two in more detail so that the educational goals of security for hardware and software developers,
system architects, system certiers, CERT members, and potential researchers are met within the
framework of engineering and computer science programs. To do so, we will examine the goals of
each within a common framework of critical thinking which is applied across virtually all university
disciplines.
Why examine both goals within a framework of critical thinking? First, the disciplines of security,
engineering, and computer science are concerned with solving problems in their respective elds of
interest. Second, each eld has systematic ways of thinking and analysis for arriving at solutions.
Third, each eld has standards. Fourth, each eld has notions of evaluation and assessment. Finally,
working within a common framework shared by many other disciplines allows us to relate goals for
security education to broader educational objectives and allows us to adapt assessment techniques
used by other disciplines to security as science and engineering.
In Section 3.1 we describe a framework for critical thinking. Section 3.2 relates the disciplines
of security, engineering, and computer science within that framework. Section 3.3 examines how
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well the relationship between security and engineering meets the educational goals of information
security and engineering on the basis of published criteria and goals.
3.1 A Framework for Critical Thinking
The importance of critical thinking as a higher order framework is identied by former Secretary
of Labor, Robert Reich in his book, The Work of Nations, [31]. Reich puts forth four skills in
particular: 1) abstraction, 2) system thinking, 3) experimentation and testing, and 4) collaboration.
Paul and Willsen in [33] summarize Reich's list of skills as follows:
1. Command of Abstractions
The capacity for abstraction { for discovering patterns and meanings { is, of course, the
very essence of symbolic analysis, in which reality must be simplied so that it can be
understood and manipulated in new ways : : : (pp. 229 { 230)
2. Thinking Within Systems
The education of the symbolic analyst emphasizes system thinking. Rather than teach
students how to solve a problem that is presented to them, they are taught to examine why
the problem arises and how it is connected to other problems. (p. 231)
3. Testing Ideas
Instead of emphasizing the transmission of information, the focus is on judgment and
interpretation. The student is taught to get behind the data { to ask why certain facts have
been selected, why they are important, how they were deduced, and how they might be
contradicted. The student learns to examine reality from many angles, in dierent lights,
and thus to visualize new possibilities and choices. The symbolic-analytic mind is trained
to be skeptical, curious, and creative. (p. 230)
4. Learning to Collaborate and Communicate
Students learn to articulate, clarify, and then restate for one another how they identify and
nd answers. They learn how to seek and accept criticism from peers, solicit help, and give
credit to others. They also learn to negotiate { to explain their own needs, to discern what
others need and view things from others' perspectives. (p. 233)
The list of skills identied by Reich is the essence of critical thinking. Critical thinking is
described by Diane Halpern [17] as:
the use of those cognitive skills or strategies that increase the probability of a desirable outcome.
It is : : : purposeful, reasoned, and goal directed { the kind of thinking involved in solving
problems, formulating inferences, calculating likelihoods, and making decisions when the thinker
is using skills that are thoughtful and eective for the particular context and type of thinking
task.
Richard Paul and Jane Willsen in [34] rene Halpern's denition to an individual's point of view
as a series of questions:
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What is the purpose of my thinking?
What precise question am I trying to answer?
Within what point of view am I thinking?
What information am I using?
How am I interpreting that information?
What concepts or ideas are central to my thinking?
What conclusions am I coming to?
What am I taking for granted, what assumptions am I making?
If I accept the conclusions, what are the implications?
What would the consequences be, if I put my thought into action?
The framework we use to describe security and engineering is based on the critical thinking
framework of Paul and Nosich, [32]:
1. What is the discipline's purpose, goal, or end?
2. What are the questions at issue, or problems to be solved?
3. What are the discipline's points of view, or frames of reference?
4. What are the empirical dimensions of reasoning in the discipline?
5. What are the conceptual dimensions of reasoning?
6. What assumptions are made by the discipline?
7. How is the discipline used to draw implications and consequences?
8. What inferences can be made drawing upon the discipline?
Using the above framework, we can answer the questions as they pertain to security and engi-
neering, and relate the two disciplines within the framework.
3.2 Relating Security, Engineering, and Computer ScienceWithin a Framework
of Critical Thinking
In Goals for Security Education [19] and NPS CISR: Six Years of Experience [21], Irvine describes
topics chosen to illustrate and enforce the notion [4] that certain components of the system must be
designed to be both continuously eective in enforcing policy and resistant to malicious software:
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 security policy models
 formal methods applied to system specication, development, and
analysis
 hardware and software protection mechanisms
 secure system design, implementation and testing
 database security
 modern cryptography
 cryptographic protocols
 key management and key distribution
 auditing
 identication and authentication
 coherent network security architectures
Peeger and Cooper in [29] list ve broad classications of security concepts.
1. Policy { understanding threats from which information requires protection to insure con-
dentiality, integrity, and availability.
2. Privilege { creating mechanisms to distinguish and control the ability of active system entities
to access and aect system resources.
3. Identication and authorization { associating the activities of the executing computer with
individual users, who may be held accountable for the activities undertaken on their behalf.
4. Correctness { with providing assurance that the hardware, software, and systems for security
policy enforcement are not susceptible to tampering or bypass.
5. Audit { the creation of traces and their interpretation.
The above are a mixture of techniques, goals, and properties. To relate them to computer
engineering and science curricula, we use the framework as shown in Table 2. Sections 3.2.1 through
3.2.8 summarize the elements of each discipline within the framework. Educational outcomes are
listed for each element.
3.2.1 Purpose, Goal, or End
Major goals in computer engineering and computer science is to construct computer systems or
processes which meet a desired end or requirement. A major goal of security is to develop com-
puting systems that can ensure security policy enforcement in the presence of malicious software
and abusive user behavior. Hence the goal may encompass policy objectives for information con-
dentiality, integrity, and availability. In addition, the system must provide a mechanism to hold its
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Table 2: Security and Engineering in a Critical Framework
Elements Security Engineering
Purpose, goal, or end. Develop security policy based on
threats. Build system providing
assurance of correct and continu-
ous security policy enforcement.
Construct computer systems or
processes to meet a desired end
or requirement.
Questions or prob-
lems to be solved.
How are security properties de-
scribed in the context of an au-
tomated system? How are se-
curity properties engineered into
systems? What assurance can
be provided that these proper-
ties do in fact exist in the im-
plementation and that they are
tamper-resistant?
What are the structures of hard-
ware, software, and subsystem
components which satisfy the
properties? What is the means
of construction? By what means
are the design and implementa-
tion veried and tested?
Points of view and
frames of reference.
Architects, software designers,
hardware designers.
Various applications: operating
systems, secure subsystems, se-
cure networking and distributed
computing, databases, etc.
Architects, software designers,
hardware designers.
Various applications: proces-
sors, operating systems, compil-
ers, databases, etc.
Empirical dimensions
of reasoning.
Experiments. Penetration test-
ing, aw hypothesis methodol-
ogy, covert channel analysis, lab-
oratory demonstrations, system
administration issues, problems
in commercial systems.
Experiments. Laboratory
demonstrations, prototypes,
simulation, testing, performance
measurements.
Conceptual dimen-
sions of reasoning.
Principles of construction and
analysis. Information theory,
discrete mathematics, cryptog-
raphy theory, formal protocols,
formal logics, formal methods,
object-model design.
Principles of construction and
analysis. Switching theory, -
nite automata, discrete math-
ematics, linear systems theory,
logic, declarative programming,
object-oriented design.
Assumptions made. Components, services,
functions, and properties for
each level of design and frame of
reference.
Components, services,
functions, and properties for
each level of design and frame of
reference.
Implications and con-
sequences.
Risk analysis. Maintenance.
User acceptability. Trusted dis-
tribution. Conguration man-
agement. Cost. Ethics.
Risk, safety, and reliability anal-
ysis. Ease of manufacture. Cost.
Ease of maintenance. Ethics.
Inferences. Auditing and trace analysis. In-
trusion detection. Fail secure
operation. System test and ver-
ication.
Fault detection. Error detection.
System test and verication.
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users accountable for their actions through identication and authentication, and audit. Finally,
users must have condence that their information will, in fact, be protected within the system.
Educational Outcomes
 Ability to clearly state the purpose of a requirement, its signi-
cance, and its achievability.
 Ability to determine the consistency of requirements and purposes.
3.2.2 Questions or Problems to be Solved
The fundamental characteristic of engineering is the ability to answer the question, does this struc-
ture of components have the properties which are required? This question is asked at all levels of
design, from the level where components are transistors, to the level where components themselves
are systems of hardware and software.
In system design, many properties must be satised. Security requirements, broken down to
condentiality, integrity, and availability, are formulated as properties that must hold during sys-
tem operation. The question at each level of design is, does this structure of components map
to a mechanism for security policy enforcement for which we have condence in the presence of
malicious code? The use of formal security policy models, formal specications, and assurance
mappings to provide a chain of evidence that the implementation does correspond to policy, in
combination with the development of high level security architectures and their step-wise rene-
ment permits the precise articulation of security requirements and demonstrates the feasibility of
a real implementation.
Educational Outcomes
 Ability to clearly formulate questions of signicance relative to the
overall purpose.
 Ability to clearly and precisely state the problem to be solved and
how it can be decomposed.
 Ability to determine feasibility of problem solution.
3.2.3 Points of View and Frames of Reference
The points of view and frames of reference for both security and engineering are given in terms
of roles and applications. The technical roles in security were identied in Section 2 as system
architects, software and hardware developers, system certiers, CERT members, and hardware
designers. These roles have meaning in both engineering and security. These roles are characterized
mainly by the components, functions, services, and means of reasoning available to each.
For example, system architects assume as components particular networks, network services,
hardware platforms, and operating systems. Security concerns at the architecture level may entail
describing a combination of computer and network security mechanisms to insure a coherent system
for the enforcement of policy. When building a secure system, the designers may take as axioms
the trustworthiness of the system security ocer, a particular instruction-set architecture and
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programming language. Using hardware and software, it is possible to construct a system to
insure process isolation and the protection of the operating system. The software developer will be
concerned with the eective use of hardware mechanisms to support these objectives. The hardware
designer will attempt to construct devices that substantively support protection objectives while
admitting a wide variety of software implementations. A hardware designer may assume a particular
cell library, memory organization, instruction-set, etc. Security concerns may focus on correctness.
System elements such as processors, operating systems, compilers, databases, networks, etc., are
signicant application areas for both engineering and security.
Educational Outcomes
 Ability to design and analyze solutions to meet requirements and
specications at multiples levels of abstraction and with several
viewpoints.
 Ability to understand the impact actions in one level or viewpoint
have on other levels or viewpoints.
 Ability to trade-o several requirements from dierent view points
in order to achieve the maximum benet.
3.2.4 Empirical Dimensions of Reasoning
The empirical dimension is concerned with experiments and with the results attained on \real"
systems. In engineering, empirical results are obtained on the \lab bench" by building prototypes,
instrumenting systems, measuring their performance, and by testing and simulation.
All of the above empirical methods are applicable to security. Functional interface testing,
internal engineering tests of selected subsystems, system generation and recovery tests, as well as
unit and module testing are all part of the development process for a secure system [26]. Hardware
may be examined for aws [41], covert channels analyzed [24, 49], and systematic penetration
analyses based on the Flaw Hypothesis Methodology [47] conducted. Analyses are conducted and
prototype systems are built and examined for security aws, such as vulnerability to \real" attacks.
Performance issues may also be examined by balancing expected decreases in vulnerability versus
user convenience and system eciency. Techniques for assessing the vulnerability of systems may
be used to examine real systems for real aws.
Educational Outcomes
 Ability to construct experiments or prototypes to demonstrate
some purpose or facilitate some meaningful exploration.
 Ability to observe, collect, analyze, and interpret data from exper-
iments.
3.2.5 Conceptual Dimensions of Reasoning
The conceptual dimensions of reasoning dene the discipline. In computer engineering and science,
the fundamental theoretical concepts are based on mathematics, logic, and physics. The theoretical
concepts form the principles of construction and analysis.
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In electrical and computer engineering, linear systems theory is based on the sinusoidal com-
position of signals and on superposition. This gives rise to the classical treatments of networks,
controls, and communications theory.
The construction of computer hardware and to a lesser extent software, is based on proposi-
tional logic, predicate calculus, discrete mathematics, and nite-state machine theory. Functional
programming and object-oriented design depend on type theory.
In addition to applying standard mathematical foundations for constructing hardware and soft-
ware, security also includes theoretical concepts to support the development and use of cryptography
and cryptographic functions; cryptographic protocols; formal policy models; formal specication;
and the use of formal methods for verication and covert channel analysis. The means for analysis
is based on discrete mathematics, information theory and mathematical logic { such as standard
predicate calculus, modal logic, and specialized belief logics.
Educational Outcomes
For each level of design abstraction, application, and for each require-
ment:
 Clear understanding of the mathematical, logical, and physical con-
cepts which form the analytical basis and principles of construction.
 Ability to apply analytical concepts and principles of construction
to the analysis and construction of real systems.
3.2.6 Assumptions Made
The assumptions which are made by each discipline are based on the components, services, and
properties assumed to be available for each level of design and frame of reference. Design levels and
levels of abstraction are dened by these assumptions as well as the particular rules of composition
used for for creating structures of components. For example, designers of authentication protocols
assume the presence of encryption functions of suitable strength. Designers of software assume the
correctness of the hardware platform supporting the instruction-set architecture. Secure system
designers may assume that the System Security Ocer/Administrator is trustworthy and that the
compiler, placed under conguration management, does not contain artices to create trapdoors.
A means to check consistency between security and engineering concerns is to check the underly-
ing assumptions made by each set of concerns. Inconsistent assumptions are caused by mismatches
in design levels, frames of reference, or applications.
Educational Outcomes
For each level of design abstraction, application, and for each require-
ment:
 Ability to clearly state assumptions being made.
 Ability to justify the assumptions being made.
 Ability to check the consistency of assumptions being made.
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3.2.7 Implications and Consequences
In both engineering and security, the implications and consequences of design decisions and system
behaviors have their impact on:
 Risk analysis;
 Cost;
 Ease of manufacture;
 Ease of maintenance;
 Reliability; and
 Ethical considerations.
The determination of implications and consequences relies on all the previous elements of the
framework. The correct balancing of consequences is sometimes termed as \business sense." Expe-
rienced and successful system architects and designers nd this correct balance based on experience,
empirical reasoning, and conceptual reasoning coupled with a deep understanding of the intended
purpose or goal.
Determining the ethical consequences of computer use is complex [5] but may be based on the
following criteria in Table 1:
 An understanding of professional and ethical responsibility;
 The broad education necessary to understand the impact of engineering solutions in a global
and societal context; and
 A knowledge of contemporary issues.
Educational Outcomes
 Ability to anticipate and clearly state with precision and accuracy
the positive and negative consequences.
 Ability to judge the likelihood of consequences.
3.2.8 Inferences
The elements of Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.7 are used to infer conclusions about security and
systems. Inferences which are made include the determination of:
 Fail secure and secure system recovery;
 Systematic penetration testing and the Flaw Hypothesis Methodology [47]; and
 Detection of and proving abusive behavior based on proling and audit data.
The above are concerns which are common to both security and engineering.
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Educational Outcomes
 Ability to draw correct inferences based on principles, observations,
concepts, and data.
 Ability to justify conclusions.
 Ability to draw conclusions which are relevant and consistent.
3.3 Are the Framework and Outcomes Satisfactory?
One way to evaluate the adequacy of the framework and outcomes described in Sections 3.2.1
through 3.2.8 is to compare it to stated requirements for information security education made by
computer security experts and accreditation criteria for electrical and computer engineering. We
examine the proposed educational framework against the remarks made by employers in the com-
puter security eld at the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy [39, 6], the 1997 ACM
Workshop on Education in Computer Security [44], and the 1997 National Colloquium for Infor-
mation Systems Security Education [23], and against the accreditation requirements for electrical
and computer engineering proposed by the IEEE.
1. Bill Murray, Senior Vice President, Deloitte and Touch said [23]:
\Computer science education with respect to security needs rigor, discipline and sound
engineering values."
2. Roger Schell, Senior Development Manager for Information Security, Netware Systems Group,
Novell, Inc. [39] asked for individuals who:
 Understand fundamental computer science concepts; and
 Can think critically.
3. Jim Schindler, Information Security Program Manager at Hewlett Packard has described
security professionals as individuals who are able to adapt and build secure systems in a world
of changing technology, changing computer paradigms and changing security requirements
[39].
4. John Kauza, Vice President for Security, ATT, provided his list of skills and core competencies
as follows, [23]:
 Ethics;
 Security orientation;
 Technical computer science knowledge; and
 Operational/practical expertise to think and apply to industry.
5. Steve Barnett, of the National Security Agency, [6] made the following points:
 Security solutions must be sought in the context of changing technology.
 Focus on the supportive skills in other classes including:
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{ architecture and design; and
{ hardware, software, and protocols for systems and networks.
 Complement formal approaches to security with practical examples and applications.
 Security requires a comprehensive systems approach and students must
{ Be able to state security requirements;
{ Be able to design to meet those requirements;
{ Be able to implement the design correctly;
{ Be able to test designs and implementations; and
{ Be able to manage system conguration and maintenance.
6. Daniel Faigin, of the Aerospace Corporation's Trusted Computer Systems Department, which
is involved in testing, security research, and system evaluations, described:
 Basic Skills
{ Fundamental understanding of software engineering techniques;
{ Understanding a specic area such as: operating system design and architecture, information
systems security, networks, or database applications; and
{ Good communication skills;
 Supplemental skills
{ Familiarity with secure system evaluation criteria; and
{ Experience with
 Hardware,
 Formal mathematical logic,
 Testing and testing methodologies, and
 Various languages and operating systems.
Given the above list, we respond to the main points of each as follows.
1. Examining these points, items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, all specify that security is not an isolated
discipline but part of the larger context of engineering and computer science. The framework
relates engineering and security within each element of the framework which covers top-level
goals, design, implementation, analysis, and testing.
2. Kauza species that ethics be part of security education. This is also part of engineering edu-
cation and is part of the common framework under implications and consequences. However,
it is noteworthy that a conclusion emerging from the 1997 WECS [18] was that information
responsibility should be taught well before students enter institutions of higher education and
that the appropriate venue for social, legal and ethical issues associated with computing may
be program dependent.
3. Kauza, Faigin, and Schindler require operational expertise applicable to industry. This is
covered within the framework under empirical dimensions of reasoning.
4. The remaining points deal with specic concerns over linking security to several engineering
activities spanning requirements, specication, design, implementation, testing, and valida-
tion. The proposed framework covers requirements through testing and validation. Barnett's
plea for theory to inform practice and practice to inform theory is reected in both the
conceptual and empirical dimensions of reasoning.
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Table 3: Accreditation Criteria for Electrical and Computer Engineering
Proposed Program Criteria for Electrical, Computer, and
Similarly Named Engineering Programs
Submitted by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Incorporated
January 16, 1997 (Revised 2/5/97, 2/21/97, 3/4/97, 3/8/97)
These program criteria apply to engineering programs which include electrical, elec-
tronic, computer, or similar modiers in their titles.
Curriculum
Programs must demonstrate that their graduates have achieved the outcomes listed in
Criterion 3 in three or more areas of electrical and/or computer engineering as appro-
priate to the program name and objectives. Graduates must demonstrate knowledge
of probability and statistics, including applications appropriate to the program name
and objectives. Graduates must demonstrate knowledge of mathematics through dif-
ferential and integral calculus, basic science, and engineering science necessary to
analyze and design complex devices and systems containing hardware and software
components and appropriate to program objectives. Graduates of programs containing
the modier electrical in the title must also demonstrate the knowledge of advanced
mathematics, typically including dierential equations, linear algebra, and complex
variables. Graduates of programs containing the modier computer in the title must
also demonstrate knowledge of discrete mathematics.
5. Schell synthesized the requirements by asking for engineers and scientists who are capable of
thinking critically about security within systems, as opposed to technicians who are merely
knowledgeable of security techniques. Placing security and engineering within a framework
of critical thinking directly addresses this higher order requirement.
How well does the proposed framework meet the accreditation requirements for engineering?
The accreditation criteria for electrical and computer engineering programs proposed by the IEEE
is shown in Table 3. They refer to Criterion 3 contained in Table 1. Programs must demonstrate
that graduates have:
 Achieved the outcomes listed in Criterion 3 in three or more areas of electrical and/or com-
puter engineering;
 Knowledge and application of mathematics and engineering science necessary to analyze and
design complex devices and systems containing hardware and software; and
 Knowledge of discrete mathematics.
All of the above items are contained within the proposed framework. If proper attention is placed
to the element of points of view and frames of reference, multiple design levels and applications will
be addressed.
17
4 Assessing the Results
Assessment of systems is an accepted practice by the security community. For example, the Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [25] describe seven system rating classes and their
respective functional and assurance requirements. (See Table 4 from Gasser [16]). For consumers,
the ratings provide an independent technical assessment of the likelihood that a system contains a
aw that would result in a catastrophic failure to enforce security policy. The objective is to assess
systems based on their behaviors, capabilities, and degree of condence in the implementation.
Table 4: Trusted System Evaluation Criteria Ratings
Class Title
Key Features
A1 Veried Design
Formal top-level specication and verication, formal
covert channel analysis, informal code correspondence
demonstration.
B3 Security Domains
Reference monitor (security kernel), \highly resistant
to penetration."
B2
Structured
Protection
Formal model, covert channels constrained, security-
oriented architecture, \relatively resistant to penetra-
tion."
B1
Labeled Security Pro-
tection
Mandatory access controls, security labeling, removal
of security-related aws.
C2
Controlled Access
Protection
Individual accountability, extensive auditing, add-on
packages.
C1
Discretionary
Security Protection
Discretionary access controls, protection against acci-
dents among cooperating users.
D
Minimal Protection Unrated.
The problem faced by educators is how to assess the capabilities of students. How do we judge
whether students have learned and if so, how much? This is not merely the administration of tests,
most of which traditionally assessed lower-order skills such as recall. Rather, the challenge is to see
if students are able to \think like an engineer or think like a computer security specialist."
One measure of a successful curriculum is when there is compelling evidence that students who
complete a curriculum have achieved the specied educational outcomes. The type of evidence
gathered depends on answers to questions such as:
 What are the desired educational outcomes?
 What are some behaviors or indicators which characterize the outcomes?
 What are the underlying principles which are important?
 What are the standards used to judge quality?
Educational assessment is important because it addresses quality. Are students in fact learning?
Do graduates in fact possess the required skills? Assessment is based on the culture of evidence,
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much as the TCSEC uses coherent groupings of functional properties and assurance evidence to
make its assessments. A justication for assessment is found in Learning through Assessment: A
Resource Guide for Higher Education, [2]:
Through assessment, educators meet responsibilities to students and to the public. There is
a compelling public stake in education. As educators, we have a responsibility to the publics
that support or depend on us to provide information about the ways in which our students
meet goals and expectations. But that responsibility goes beyond the reporting of such infor-
mation; our deeper obligation { to ourselves, our students and society { is to improve. Those
to whom educators are accountable have corresponding obligation to support such attempts at
improvement.
The four principles of assessment put forth by the American Association for Higher Education
(AAHE) [2] which apply to this paper are:
1. The assessment of student learning begins with educational values.
2. Assessment is most eective when it reects an understanding of learning as multidimensional,
integrated, and revealed in performance over time.
3. Assessment works best when the programs it seeks to improve have clear, explicitly stated
purposes.
4. Assessment requires attention to outcomes but also and equally to the experiences that lead
to those outcomes.
The framework and outcomes are consistent with and supportive of the above principles. First,
the values cited by Reich [31] as supported by the skills of 1) abstraction, 2) system thinking,
3) experimentation and testing, and 4) collaboration and communication, are elements of the
framework and are listed as specic educational outcomes in several elements.
Second, the framework and outcomes are spread over several viewpoints and activities which
span all design levels and link theory to practice. The outcomes are likely to be achieved by several
sequences of courses through a curriculum over several years and not by a single course in one
semester. The framework provides a means to link the various elements across engineering and
security.
Third, the framework and outcomes have the explicit purpose of linking engineering and security.
The elements of the framework identify common ground between engineering and security which
mutually support the outcomes.
Fourth, the framework identies a variety of experiences and activities as means for meeting the
outcomes. Theory and practice are contained as are low-level and high-level design and analysis.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop the precise assessment instruments to be
used, the use of critical thinking as a higher-order organizing framework allows for the specialization
of assessment tools for critical thinking to the critical framework for engineering and security. Paul
and Nosich in [32] provide high-level examples for each of the eight elements of the framework.
Tables 6 and 7 are excerpted from [32] as examples. The remaining six are found in [32].
More detail on curricula development and assessment can be found in Diamond's Designing and
Improving Courses and Curricula in Higher Education, [11].
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Table 5: A Partial Listing of Assessment Principles from AAHE
Principles of Good Practice for Assessing Student Learning
Developed under the auspices of the AAHE Assessment Forum, December 1992
1. The assessment of student learning begins with educational values.
Assessment is not an end in itself but a vehicle for educational improvement. Its
eective practice, then, begins with and enacts a vision of the kinds of learning
we most value for students and strive to help them achieve. Educational values
should drive not only what we choose to assess but also how we do so. Where
questions about educational mission and values are skipped over, assessment
threatens to be an exercise in measuring what's easy, rather than a process of
improving what we really care about.
2. Assessment is most eective when it reects an understanding of
learning as multidimensional, integrated, and revealed in perfor-
mance over time. Learning is a complex process. It entails not only what
students know but what they can do with what they know; it involves not only
knowledge and abilities but values, attitudes, and habits of mind that aect
both academic success and performance beyond the classroom. Assessment
should reect these understandings by employing a diverse array of methods,
including those that call for actual performance, using them over time so as to
reveal change, growth, and increasing degrees of integration. Such an approach
aims for a more complete and accurate picture of learning, and therefore rmer
bases for improving our students' educational experience.
3. Assessment works best when the programs it seeks to improve have
clear, explicitly stated purposes. Assessment is a goal-oriented process.
It entails comparing educational performance with educational purposes and
expectations { those derived from the institution's mission, from faculty inten-
tions in program and course design, and from knowledge of students' own goals.
Where program purposes lack specicity or agreement, assessment as a process
pushes a campus towards clarity about where to aim and what standards to
apply; assessment also prompts attention to where and how program goals will
be taught and learned. Clear, shared, implementable goals are the cornerstone
for assessment that is focused and useful.
4. Assessment requires attention to outcomes but also and equally to
the experiences that lead to those outcomes. Information about out-
comes is of high importance; where students \end up" matters greatly. But to
improve outcomes, we need to know about student experience along the way {
about the curricula, teaching, and kind of student eort that lead to particular
outcomes. Assessment can help us understand which students learn best under
what conditions; with such knowledge comes the capacity to improve the whole
of their learning.
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Table 6: Assessing the Question at Issue or Central Problem, from Paul
Question at Issue or Central Problem
(All reasoning is an attempt to gure something out,
to settle some question, solve some problem)
Fundamental Standards: 1) Clarity of Question, 2) Signicance of Question, 3)
Answerability, 4) Relevance
Flawed Questions: 1) Unclear, 2) Insignicant, 3) Not Answerable, 4) Irrelevant
Principle: To settle a question you must understand what it requires
Good Reasoners: Bad Reasoners: Feedback to Students:
are clear about the ques-
tion they are trying to set-
tle
are often unclear about the
kind of question they are
asking
(-) The main question at is-
sue is never made clear.
(+) You did a good job of
clarifying the question at
issue.
can re-express a question in
a variety of ways
express questions vaguely
and nd them dicult to
reformulate
(-) You need to reformulate
your question in a couple of
ways to recognize the com-
plexity of it.
(+) I like the way you re-
formulate your question in
dierent ways. It helps the
reader see it from dierent
points of view.
can break a question into
sub-questions
are unable to break down
the questions they are ask-
ing
(+) You do a good job of
analyzing the main ques-
tion into sub-questions.
(-) It would be easier to
solve your main problem if
you would break it down
somewhat.
have sensitivity to the kind
of question they are asking
routinely distinguish ques-
tions of dierent type
have little sensitivity to the
kind of questions they are
asking,
confuse questions of dier-
ent types, often respond in-
appropriately to the ques-
tions they ask
(-) You are confusing a le-
gal question with a moral
one.
(+) You do a good job of
keeping the economic is-
sues separate from the so-
cial ones.
distinguish questions they
can answer from questions
they can't
try to answer questions
they are not in a position
to answer
(+) You were correct in
leaving that question unan-
swered, and in recogniz-
ing what extra information
you would need to answer
the question
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Table 7: Assessing Inference and Conclusion, from Paul
Inference & Conclusion
(All reasoning contains inferences by which we draw
conclusions and give meaning to data)
Fundamental Standards: 1) Clarity of Inferences, 2) Justiability of Inferences, 3)
Profundity of Conclusions, 4) Reasonability of Conclusions, 5) Consistency of
Conclusions
Failure of Inferences and Conclusions: 1) Unclear, 2) Unjustied, 3) Supercial, 4)
Unreasonable, 5) Contradictory
Principle: Reasoning can only be as sound as the inferences it makes and conclu-
sions it comes to
Good Reasoners: Bad Reasoners: Feedback to Students:
make inferences that are
clear and precise
often make inferences that
are unclear
(-) It is not clear what your
main conclusion is.
(-) It is not clear what you
base your main conclusion
on.
(+) Your reasoning is very
clear and easy to follow.
usually make inferences
that follow from the evi-
dence or reasons presented
often make inferences that
do not follow from the evi-
dence or reasons presented
(-) The conclusion you
come to does not follow
from the reasons presented.
(+) You justify your con-
clusion well with support-
ing evidence and good rea-
sons.
often make inferences that
are deep rather than super-
cial
often make inferences that
are supercial
(+) Your central conclu-
sion is well-thought-out
and goes right to the heart
of the issue.
(-) Your conclusion is jus-
tied, but it seems super-
cial given the problem.
often make inferences or
come to conclusions that
are reasonable
often make inferences or
come to conclusions that
are unreasonable
(-) It is unreasonable to in-
fer a person's personality
from one action.
make inferences or come to
conclusions that are consis-
tent with each other
often make inferences or
come to conclusions that
are contradictory.
(-) The conclusions you
come to in the rst part of
your paper seem to contra-
dict the conclusions that
you come to at the end.
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5 Discussion of Security Education Programs
Cryptography and the use of cryptographic protocols is appealing as a single-course topic. Many
books and texts are available for teaching cryptography and network security, e.g. [45, 37, 43,
15, 22]. Cryptography and its use in secure communication protocols is an important aspect of
network security and secure distributed architectures. It is straightforward for an individual to
study a small collection of books and papers and become a competent instructor in this area
without an extensive apprenticeship in the eld. ( We note that caution should be exercised when
attempting to become a practitioner. The design of good protocols and cryptosystems requires
signicant expertise [1, 36, 38].)
Despite its appeal, cryptography and its application is only one part of an overall approach to
computer and network security; a program conned to cryptography and cryptographic protocols,
will be insucient to convey to students the foundational concepts and design principles that must
be followed to successfully build secure systems. Designing and building secure systems involves
an understanding of foundational aspects of operating systems, software engineering, modeling,
and many other fundamental areas of computer science and engineering, see [10, 30, 46, 35, 3].
The framework described in this paper provides a blueprint for achieving an information security
education with an appropriately broad scope.
6 Conclusions
The increasing use, reliance upon, and vulnerability of current large-scale information systems
demands that more resilient, reliable, and secure systems be built and deployed. These issues must
receive more attention in the education of engineers and computer scientists. Security concepts are
fundamental ones which apply to all levels of system design and application. As such, technically
meaningful ways must be sought to integrate security into the engineering and computer science
curricula charged with the education of the majority of system designers and implementors. Some
undergraduate programs will oer specialized courses in computer security and graduate programs
can provide advanced security courses complemented by research. These focussed courses and
programs will be attractive to only a subset of the student population; they do not reach the vast
majority of students. A compounding factor will be the inability of many programs to add one
or more security courses to already overcrowded curricula. It is unreasonable to create separate
security curricula isolated from those of engineering and computer science. A reasonable approach
is to integrate security concerns in technically meaningful ways into engineering and computer
science curricula.
Using the critical framework of Section 3, the technical aspects of security are found to be
closely related to computer engineering and science. As many of the goals, concepts, and means
of reasoning are similar, it seems both desirable and practical to incorporate elements of each into
the disciplines of security and computer engineering and science.
Ideally, course material in the form of text books and laboratory examples would have computer
engineering and science integrated with security. The Air Force Academy provides an example
of a curriculum into which security has been integrated by explicitly injecting security topics into
introductory courses on operating systems, databases, software engineering, and networks [48]. This
approach has the advantage of viewing security as an important application and property which is
an integral part of computer engineering and science. At institutions where this is not immediately
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possible, security-related supplements can be added to each category in computer engineering and
science. The framework and outcomes-based assessment can be used to ensure coherence and
coverage of security skills within an engineering curriculum. As engineering programs are now
accredited using outcomes-based assessment, institutions which wish to distinguish themselves by
virtue of having an information security focus can do so and be recognized and accredited for their
eorts.
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